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AFTERWORD: DO WE REALLY BELIEVE ANY LONGER IN THE
POSSIBILITY OF “GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND
CHOICE”?  A DOUR MEDITATION ON
OUR PRESENT SITUATION
SANFORD LEVINSON*
What is the most important message that we can learn in 2007
from those who crafted our distinctly eighteenth-century Constitu-
tion?  The answer, I believe, can be found in the very first paragraph
of Federalist No. 1, where Publius, in this case Alexander Hamilton,
writes:
[I]t seems to have been reserved to the people of this coun-
try, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
question, whether societies of men are really capable or not
of establishing good government from reflection and choice,
or whether they are forever destined to depend for their po-
litical constitutions on accident and force.1
He was, after all, trying to defend a document drafted in Philadel-
phia by persons who felt themselves empowered (even if not necessa-
rily authorized) to go far beyond their initial mandate and
audaciously to draft a brand-new constitution to supplant, rather than
simply modify, the Articles of Confederation.2  Even more audacious,
perhaps, was the Framers’ decision to ignore—or, perhaps more accu-
rately, to violate—Article XIII of those Articles, which required that
any amendment achieve the unanimous assent of each state legisla-
ture.3  Article VII of the new Constitution required ratification not by
legislatures, but by conventions that were chosen in the most demo-
Copyright  2007 by Sanford Levinson.
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.  As
always, I am grateful to Mark Graber for his energies in organizing the Maryland Constitu-
tional Law Schmooze at the University of Maryland School of Law, and for his responses to
an earlier draft of these comments.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
2. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1047–48 (1988).
3. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. XIII, reprinted in MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 211, 213 (1913); see, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1017 n.6 (1984) (articulat-
ing arguments against the legality of the Constitutional Convention’s decision making).
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cratic election ever held up to that time.4  More important even than
this is that life would be breathed into the Philadelphia document if
only nine—and not all thirteen—ratification conventions assented to
the new Constitution.5  Thus these ratification conventions were given
the opportunity, which they clearly took, to ponder the draft Constitu-
tion and to decide for themselves whether it should be accepted.
As is well known, in several states, including the state that pro-
voked the writing of The Federalist itself, New York, the debate was set-
tled by extremely close votes.  The New York vote was 30 to 27; a
switch of two pro votes would have doomed the Constitution not only
in New York, but also, given the geographic location of the Empire
State, probably in the rest of the country, even though the required
nine acceptances had already taken place.6
The emphasis on—and the reality of—“reflection and choice”
surely marks the American constitutional project as importantly
linked with the Enlightenment, with its faith in the possibilities of rea-
soned argument to demonstrate the inadequacy of existing institu-
tions and the need for their replacement.  The circumstances of the
drafting—as well, for that matter, as the concession embodied in Arti-
cle V of the Constitution that the document might indeed be imper-
fect and require later amendment7—speak to the assumption that
Americans can be masters of their political fate rather than mere vic-
tims of “accident and force.”
Even more striking in this regard is the remarkable paragraph in
Federalist No. 14 where Publius (this time James Madison) defends the
possibility of the “extended republic” against the criticisms of such
distinguished political philosophers as Montesquieu.8  For my pur-
poses, more important than the substantive argument is Madison’s
description of the American people and their proper posture with re-
gard to considering any and all political arguments:
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be re-
jected merely because it may comprise what is new?  Is it not
the glory of the people of America that, whilst they have paid
4. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1049 (noting that Article VII called for a majority vote by R
a popular convention of the people of each state for ratification).
5. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
6. Clarence E. Miner, The Ratification of the Federal Constitution by the State of New York,
94 ECON. & PUB. L. 367, 485 (1921).
7. See generally RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (containing a collection of essays aimed
at exploring the possibilities and implications of constitutional amendment under the cur-
rent U.S. Constitution’s amendment scheme).
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 67–73. R
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a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for
custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their
own experience? . . .  Had no important step been taken by the
leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could not be
discovered, no government established of which an exact
model did not present itself, the people of the United States
might at this moment have been numbered among the mel-
ancholy victims of misguided councils, must at best have
been laboring under the weight of some of those forms
which have crushed the liberties of the rest of mankind.
Happily for America, happily we trust for the whole human
race, they pursued a new and more noble course.  They ac-
complished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals
of human society.  They reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed
the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their
successors to improve and perpetuate.9
In my book, Our Undemocratic Constitution,10 I am harshly critical
of Madison for promoting an almost mindless “veneration” of the
Constitution, as distinguished from his his friend Thomas Jefferson,
who argued for the desirability of frequent conventions to consider
potential defects in the document.11  Madison complained that “as
every appeal to the people would carry an implication of some defect
in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, de-
prive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every-
thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments
would not possess the requisite stability.”12  In a new Afterword to be
published in the paperback edition of my book, I note that Madison is
in fact a more complex—or perhaps schizoid—figure, inasmuch as
the almost Burkean tone of Federalist No. 49 is more than counterbal-
anced by the almost aggressively rationalist argument of his earlier
writings in The Federalist.  It should be clear that I prefer the earlier
Madison.
Finally, it is worth noting the canonical statement of John Mar-
shall, in what is almost certainly the single most important opinion
during not only his Chief Justiceship, but also, perhaps, in our entire
history: “We must never forget,” Marshall thundered, “that it is a Con-
9. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
10. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006).
11. Id. at 43.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 282. R
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stitution we are expounding . . . , a Constitution intended to endure for ages
to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human af-
fairs.”13  There are obviously all sorts of ways to adapt our Constitution
to these “various crises,” ranging from imaginative interpretations of
the existing text to self-conscious decisions, mimicking the behavior of
the Framers themselves, to forge new texts based on new understand-
ings of our political situations.
In talking about constitutions—and especially about the United
States Constitution—one is necessarily addressing some of the most
fundamental questions of politics, both theoretical and practical.
Constitutions, after all, have a point: to produce “good government.”
The criteria for what counts as such a government, in our case, are
presumably set out in the magnificent Preamble of the Constitution.14
The assumption instantiated in the history of the formation of the
Constitution is that we should be able, as political creatures, to engage
in reflective conversation with our fellow citizens about what sorts of
institutions are conducive to those goals and to liberate ourselves
from callow attachment to conventional wisdom, whether provided by
unexamined and overly venerated customs and traditions or by
linkage with the great names with whom the institutions are associ-
ated.  The Constitution, as a work of all-too-human men (and, of
course, the gendered term is absolutely accurate in this case), is neces-
sarily imperfect, and it should be our goal to improve it, as Marshall
said, to adapt it upon recognition of possible inadequacies in success-
fully meeting the inevitable “crises of human affairs.”
Indeed, part of the “reflection and choice” that occurred in 1787
was precisely to enter into compromises that could scarcely be de-
fended, either at the time or today, as primarily achieving the values
set out in the Preamble.  Most notoriously, the “blessings of liberty”
were scarcely accorded to those held in chattel slavery.15  Abigail Ad-
ams, in her unsuccessful plea to her husband to “remember the La-
dies,”16 was speaking on behalf of another group deprived of such
liberties, albeit not so severely as blacks held in bondage.  And, of
course, what is often called the “Great Compromise” involved what
Madison considered to be the outrageous extortion by small states of
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) (emphasis added).
14. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
15. Id.
16. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in THE BOOK OF ABI-
GAIL AND JOHN: SELECTED LETTERS OF THE ADAMS FAMILY 121 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds,
1975).
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equal representation in the Senate.17  He ultimately acquiesced, just
as anti-slavery delegates acquiesced to various boons given slaveowners
and slave states, because in each case the alternative was perceived as
no Constitution at all.18
For all but a few delegates, that would have been a far worse out-
come than the Constitution whose very flaws, from one perspective or
another, in fact made possible the gaining of thirty-nine signatures on
September 17, 1787, and the ratifications, ultimately, of the thirteen
states that comprised the United States of America at the time.  I dare
say that none of the thirty-nine believed that the Constitution was per-
fect.  It sufficed that the Constitution was “good enough” given the
exigencies of the moment, which included, perhaps above all, the ne-
cessity of establishing a “peace pact” among the states to ensure a uni-
fied defense against the many potential enemies of the fledgling
nation.19
It is no secret that I believe that our eighteenth-century Constitu-
tion is very much in need of repair.  And what needs repairing is what
I have taken to calling the “hard-wired” Constitution.  The hard-wired
Constitution is never litigated and, therefore, not subject to the kinds
of interpretive controversies (and dynamic changes) that give mean-
ing to what Robert Jackson correctly dubs the “majestic generalities”
of the Constitution.20  Nor, for that matter, have the Constitution’s
hard-wired structures been significantly affected by the “constitutional
moments” or other similar developments that Bruce Ackerman and
Stephen Griffin have correctly discerned as an important part of our
constitutional history.21  I believe that to a truly astonishing degree,
17. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 66–70 (1996) (discussing the debate
over states’ representation in the Senate and Madison’s arguments during the debate).
18. Id. at 58, 70.
19. See generally DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERI-
CAN FOUNDING (2003) (discussing the political and historic context of the Founding and
arguing that advocates viewed ratification of the Constitution as imperative to avoiding
war).
20. See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States, The Law Above Nations, Address Before the Inter-American Bar Association (Nov.
20, 1942), in 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 297, 300 (1943).  The most obvious such “generality” is the
Fourteenth Amendment, but I am also happy to include within this term the Bill of Rights
and, for that matter, Article I, Section 8, inasmuch as this last set of provisions was (falsely)
thought to establish a truly meaningful political reality of a national government whose
power was to be limited by reference to its “assigned” powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  This
vision of strict separation of powers, of course, did not survive the New Deal (and, had one
vote switched in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 251 (1918), it would not have
survived the innovations of the Wilson Administration).
21. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (cata-
loguing and analyzing three specific moments of constitutional change in the U.S.: the
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our most fundamental institutions would be readily recognizable by
any member of the Philadelphia convention magically transported to
our own time.
This last fact helps to explain why my own interests have increas-
ingly turned away from constitutional interpretation and toward re-
flection on what most people—entirely incorrectly—believe are
boring “civics course” aspects of our Constitution (typified for many
by a pedantic lesson on how a bill becomes—or, far more likely, never
has a prayer of becoming—a law, and the like).  However, I believe
that the study of the Constitution’s hard-wired structures is of su-
preme importance for those who would understand why so many
Americans, on all sides of the political spectrum, are increasingly de-
spondent about the future of our country and have little confidence
in those who are in charge of our most basic political institutions.22
For those who are interested, there are both a book-length elabo-
ration,23 and a shorter, article-length version24 of my arguments, and
there is no real need to rehearse them here.  Some of my arguments
are discussed in the contributions to this excellent Symposium.  More-
over, since the “Schmooze” that generated this Symposium, University
of Virginia political scientist Larry Sabato has published A More Perfect
Constitution: 23 Proposals To Revitalize Our Constitution and Make America
a Fairer Country,25 which not only describes some aspects of the Consti-
tution as “archaic” and “failing America in some vital ways,”26 but also
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory
Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115 (1999) (analyzing Ackerman’s three constitutional mo-
ments and arguing as to their significance for constitutional theory).
22. As of November 1, 2007, only 25.6% of those polled believe the United States is
headed in the right direction.  69.5% think it is headed in the wrong direction, with the
remaining 5% presumably being uncertain.  Overall approval of Congress is a staggering
23.5%, though, interestingly enough, there is marginally higher approval for both the
Democratic (32.9%) and Republican (27.3%) members of Congress.  President Bush cur-
rently logs a 33.1% approval rate, which actually represents a slight uptick in his rating.
Political Arithmetik, http://politicalarithmetik.blogspot.com/2007/05/right-direction-or-
wrong-track.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
23. LEVINSON, supra note 10. R
24. Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit
in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859 (2007); Sanford Levinson, Afterword, 55 DRAKE L. REV.
1009 (2007); Sanford Levinson, Get me rewrite!  George Washington didn’t think the Constitution
was sacrosanct—why do we?  It’s time for a new constitutional convention, B. GLOBE, Oct. 22,
2006, (Ideas), at 1–2, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/
2006/10/22/get_me_rewrite?mode=PF.
25. LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION (2007); see also Sanford Levinson,
Two Books Debate Brilliance and Disasters of the Constitution, AUST. AM.-STATEMAN, Oct. 14,
2007, available at http://www.statesman.com/life/content/life/stories/books/10/14/1014
constitution.html (reviewing LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT CONSTITUTION (2007)).
26. SABATO, supra note 25, at 1. R
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goes on to advocate a new constitutional convention as a means of
making it more truly relevant to our twenty-first century realities.
It is certainly gratifying to have at least one distinguished ally in
this effort to generate the first national constitutional convention
since 1787.27  However, I concede that we stand, relatively speaking, in
splendid isolation even among our fellow academics—let alone prac-
ticing pundits and politicians.  There are certainly no contemporary
analogues to such early-twentieth-century figures as Woodrow Wilson
and Theodore Roosevelt, who were willing to speak of the possibility
of fundamental constitutional change from the commanding heights
of political power.  Nor are there analogues to lesser, albeit still signifi-
cant, leaders like Robert LaFollette.28  The spirit of Madison’s Federal-
ist No. 49 has clearly prevailed over the robust self-confidence
displayed in Federalist No. 14.29  Moreover, speaking only from my own
experiences, I can testify that if it feels like swimming against the cur-
rent even to suggest that there are significant deficiencies in the Con-
stitution—a document that I myself identified in my first book,
Constitutional Faith, as the linchpin of the American “civil religion”30—
it becomes more like swimming up a waterfall to suggest that the cure
for what ails us lies through the path of a new constitutional
convention.
It is, of course, possible that Sabato and I are simply mistaken and
that the Constitution in fact deserves the veneration that it continues
to receive from most Americans.  But, aside from completely self-serv-
ing explanations for why I reject that account, I think it worth noting
that in speaking to various audiences over the past year, usually, but
not always, in academic settings, I have rarely heard them declare that
the Constitution is without imperfection.  How many people, after all,
are willing to defend each and every one of the following features of
our Constitution that continue in important ways to structure our con-
temporary polity and the sense of political possibility:
1) The Electoral College;
2) the distribution of voting power in the Senate;
3) the presidential veto, which serves, in effect, to turn us
into a tricameral system of government where one of the
“houses” is the White House, inhabited by a single individual
27. There have been 233 state constitutional conventions over the course of our his-
tory. See JOHN DINEEN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 7 (2006).
28. See generally NANCY C. UNGER, FIGHTING BOB LAFOLLETTE: THE RIGHTEOUS RE-
FORMER (2000).
29. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 14, 49 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 67–73, 281–85. R
30. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1989).
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who can negate substantial majorities of the House and the
Senate with regard to potential solutions to national
problems;
4) the fixed presidential term that, in effect, makes it impos-
sible to remove presidents (and commanders in chief) in
whom the country has lost confidence concerning issues of
war and peace, life and death;
5) life tenure for Supreme Court justices; and
6) the near impossibility of Article V amendment?
These are only the most glaring defects.  I assure you there are
others.
But even if there is at least modest concession from many that the
Constitution could be improved, there is almost visceral horror at the
possibility of a new constitutional convention.  Many people—includ-
ing, perhaps, most readers of this Symposium—imagine such a con-
vention would be constituted by some combination of fools and
mountebanks.  Why, indeed, would any rational person look to such a
convention for cogent correction of constitutional inadequacies?
Isn’t it all too likely that it would simply make things worse?
One can’t rule out such possibilities, of course.  All of us know
that unintended consequences of even the best-motivated actions can
often leave us in an overall worse situation.  As Albert Hirschman has
pointed out, though, the insistence that unintended consequences
will almost always be baleful and efface intended social improvement
is one of the standard tropes of what he terms the politically conserva-
tive “rhetoric of reaction.”31  In any event, there is a reason why peo-
ple often conclude that the devil we know is preferable to the
(possibility of) the devil we do not, or why the same people may insist
that something be demonstrably and absolutely broken before any ef-
fort be made to fix it.32
Reliance on such homely maxims, for me, is answerable at least in
part by evoking Madison’s own statements in Federalist No. 14 (though,
to be sure, one must first believe that the Constitution indeed is signif-
icantly defective).33  But I believe that something deeper is involved in
the rejection of the very possibility of a new convention.  I am fearful
that that something is fear—perhaps even contempt—of our fellow
31. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
AND JEOPARDY (1991).
32. In this context, see generally THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN
BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006)
(analyzing Congress’s attitude toward institutional reform).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 67–73. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-1\MLR116.txt unknown Seq: 9 11-DEC-07 14:12
2007] A DOUR MEDITATION ON OUR PRESENT SITUATION 289
citizens that casts a deep shadow over what we might like to think is
one of the most important aspects of our constitutionalism: the
linkage with a project of self-governance.
Description of the full project of American constitutionalism re-
quires attention not only to the substantive goals articulated in the
Preamble, but also to the decisive statement of Abraham Lincoln that
the ultimate justification for memorializing the thousands who per-
ished at Gettysburg was our adherence to the proposition “that gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish
from the earth.”34  I have italicized the middle term precisely because
it most definitively differentiates what most of us would define as a
“democratic” (or, for that matter, “civic-republican”) form of govern-
ment from, say, a “benevolent despotism” that might well be commit-
ted to “government for the people” (and even, to some extent “of the
people” if, for example, one identifies the rulers with the national as-
pirations of a ethnos). “Government by the people,” on the other
hand, seems to presuppose a process of self-determination, or what
Justice Breyer recently embraced as the principle of “active liberty.”35
Basic free-speech theory accepts the proposition that genuine
self-determination must tolerate the possibility that our most basic in-
stitutions be open to criticism.36  But, of course, to say that critical
speech is protected, however desirable that is in a society predicated
on autonomy, says nothing about whether it will in fact occur or, even
more to the point, be taken seriously and acted upon.  The question,
then, is not whether Sabato and I are free to cast whatever aspersions
on the Constitution we wish, but, rather, whether any listeners might
in fact be persuaded to act on our advice.  Such action will require, as
already suggested, not only agreement with our diagnosis—the Con-
stitution is in some respects a threat to, rather than a protection of,
our most basic commitments—but also a trust in any particular group
of people who might be empowered to do something about it.  It is
just this sense of trust that seems almost altogether lacking.
One problem with a new convention, which I simply ignore in
these brief remarks, is how it would be organized after the delegates
were selected.  For example, would votes be by states or individuals?
Concomitantly, would decisions be made by a majority  (of states or
individuals) or supermajority of voters?  But there is, obviously, a prior
34. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001) (emphasis added).
35. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005).
36. See, e.g., Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267 (1990).
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question that has to be considered: how the delegates to any conven-
tion are to be chosen and whether we would have a sufficient degree
of confidence in them, however chosen, to trust them with the task of
reconsidering the contemporary adequacy of the document drafted in
1787.
Consider three possible answers to the question of selection (in-
dependent of the organizational questions mentioned above): dele-
gates might be chosen by election, by appointment, or, my own
current favorite, by a structured process of random selection (struc-
tured only to make sure that there is regional variation in those se-
lected at random based on a national sample).
I readily concede that both elections and appointments by ex-
isting political bodies present problems.  It is altogether rational to
fear that elections would turn into a circus led by single-issue groups
who would zealously reject the structural and procedural concerns
that underlie my own critique and instead try to capture the conven-
tion in order to write their own substantive hobbyhorses into the pro-
posed draft of a revised Constitution.  (One can easily think of
abortion, affirmative action, school prayer, firearms, or limitations on
the taxing power, as such “hot-button” issues).  Even without the po-
tential domination of single-issue zealots, there would also be the
problem of the inevitable role that money would play in the selection
process, and the justified fear that participation in the convention
could in effect be bought by those who wanted to protect their private
interests.  As for appointed delegates, an equally understandable fear
is that the appointing authorities will take care to name people resis-
tant to any boat rocking that might challenge the power of those do-
ing the appointing.
So I would wish us to return to ancient Athens37 (or to the Ameri-
can process of selecting juries or, in the late 1960s, draft selection),
and select the delegates through a national lottery.  This would create
a nation-wide “citizen jury” of, say, 700 to 750 citizens.  The selection
mechanism could make sure that those who would be charged with
the task of scrutinizing the Constitution and suggesting changes
would represent a wide geographic cross section of the population.
I would make the term of the new convention two years and pay
each delegate a yearly salary equal to that received by a United States
Senator or member of the Supreme Court, in recognition of the ex-
treme importance of their responsibilities.  This would also have the
37. See generally PAUL WOODRUFF, FIRST DEMOCRACY (2005) (analyzing democracy in the
context of the first democracy: ancient Athens).
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considerable virtue of making it possible for persons of modest means
to participate in such a convention.
I would also give the convention a generous budget to hold hear-
ings throughout the country and solicit reports by experts in various
areas.  Delegates would be encouraged to travel abroad to observe
how other countries have resolved those issues that are bound to
come up (though I would equally encourage delegates to take close
looks at American state constitutions in order to see how different
they can be from one another).
At the end of the two years—and, of course, I presume that the
proceedings of the Convention would be covered by the popular me-
dia and become the subject of national conversations—the delegates
would submit their proposed changes for ratification.  (Incidentally,
in order to dampen any incentives to demagoguery, I would prohibit
any of the delegates from running for election to a national-level posi-
tion, including membership in the House or Senate (assuming, of
course, these bodies are retained), until at least five years after the
adoption of the new Constitution or set of constitutional
amendments).
Why, incidentally, look to a convention and not to Congress for
this national conversation and set of proposals?  The principal answer
is altogether obvious: Congress is just too busy to take the time and make the
effort to do what we would justifiably expect of those charged with engaging in
a truly systematic review of the adequacy of the Constitution.  As Sabato
points out, the “workforce” of Representatives and Senators has not
changed in almost fifty years, since the admission of Hawaii to the
Union in 1959.38  The United States in 1960 had a population of ap-
proximately 178 million people; as of November 2007 our population
is estimated to be more than 303 million.39  The same number of 100
senators and 435 representatives are being asked to consider the legis-
lative needs of a country that has grown by approximately two-thirds
in the past half-century.  And, of course, this doesn’t begin to take
account of added complexities generated by international develop-
ments, the growth of new forms of technology, and the like.  It re-
quires no disrespect for Congress to say that they need to “hire” others
to engage in the task of reexamining our constitutional system, and
that is precisely what a convention is.  But, of course, a convention
cannot be defended without a sufficient respect for the persons likely
to be delegates.
38. See SABATO, supra note 25. R
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov.
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I note that several students in a seminar I conducted on my book
dismissed the possibility of random selection because of their belief
that most people are “idiots” who could not be trusted to engage in
deliberation and decision making as to what kinds of constitutional
changes are desirable.  (They had no more confidence, incidentally,
in elections or appointments.)  I found myself in the uncharacteristic
position of favorably quoting William F. Buckley’s famous comment,
“I would sooner live in a society governed by the first two thousand
names in the Boston telephone directory than in a society governed
by the two thousand faculty members of Harvard University.”  I disa-
gree with his particular sample set; I would personally prefer two thou-
sand Americans picked at random in a national sample.  It is also all
too likely that Buckley, not known as a populist, was expressing more
his revulsion for the presumed politics of the Harvard faculty than his
esteem for the great unwashed.  But that likely disesteem is precisely
what makes suspect Buckley’s identification as a democrat.  Do we, at
the end of the day, share that aversion?  Are we really willing to dis-
dain and dismiss as terminally naı¨ve those who really take “govern-
ment by the people” with consummate seriousness?
If one shares the belief of my students that most of their fellow
citizens within the American political community are likely to be “idi-
ots,” then I believe that the only rational conclusion is to give up on
the project of “government by the people” and simply accept one or
another version of full-scale elite rule with as little popular accounta-
bility as is possible to forestall revolution.  There are those, of course,
who say that this is just what the Constitution has managed to create,
though it is a bit hard for me to believe that a true elitist would be an
unequivocal fan of the American Constitution.  It is obvious, after all,
that the Constitution has not come close to acting as Madison had
suggested in would in Federalist No. 10, i.e., as a “filter” making sure
that leaders of sufficient public “virtue” would be selected by the pop-
ulace to govern them.40
A common response to my call for a new convention is to ask if
I’m not afraid of a runaway conclave that would, say, repeal the Bill of
Rights or declare us to be a theocracy.  The answer is that I am not, for
two quite different reasons.  The first is that I am confident that any
such “runaway” convention would doom its project to failure.
Whether the mode of ratification be popular national referendum
(my own preference, though this would obviously require an end run
around Article V), or state-by-state legislative response (or state con-
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 45, 50–51. R
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ventions), as required by Article V, it is exceedingly unlikely that a
“runaway” convention would represent enough of the country to suc-
ceed.  Here it is useful to look at the experience of state constitutional
conventions, of which there have been literally dozens over our his-
tory.  The most common explanation for the failure of such conven-
tions is their “capture” by a particular interest group that is then
rejected by the population at large when asked to ratify the conven-
tion’s (and interest group’s) handiwork.
But the more important response is that I am not so fearful of my
fellow Americans, even in these parlous times, as are most of those
who appear to be quivering with fright at the idea of a new conven-
tion.  Part of the reason is that I have myself observed one of James
Fishkin’s “deliberative polls,” from which I draw my support for a ran-
domly selected group of delegates.41  His first such gathering was held
in Austin, Texas in 1996, and it was moving indeed to see very differ-
ent people—I think in particular of an elderly white-haired conserva-
tive from upstate Michigan and an African-American single mother on
welfare from New Orleans—actually make human and intellectual
contact with one another as they were discussing what might consti-
tute a sensible policy of public welfare.  And Fishkin has subsequently
conducted such polls—I might prefer the term “deliberative assem-
blies”—literally all over the world, including Australia, Bulgaria, and
China, to use only the first three letters of the alphabet.42  All rely on
the proposition that ordinary people can reflect on important issues if
treated with dignity and supplied with relevant information.
Whether the United States is truly committed to a twenty-first-
century notion of democracy, whether this means simply a principle
of one person, one vote (most spectacularly violated by the Senate,
the Electoral College, the presidential veto, and the procedures for
constitutional amendment set out in Article V), or a more complex
notion of genuine self-determination and government by the people,
is an issue of world-wide—and not just local—importance.  For better
or worse, the United States has committed itself to the spread of de-
mocracy around the world.  Democracy, at least when we are chastis-
ing other countries for lacking it, is presumed to be a “good thing.”
But this requires not only some clarity in what we mean by democracy,
which is stunningly lacking in contemporary debate; but it also re-
41. See generally JAMES FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991) (developing the deliberative poll model).
42. See The Center for Deliberative Democracy, Deliberative Polling, http://cdd.stan-
ford.edu/polls/.
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quires—whatever one’s answer to the definitional question—some de-
gree of genuine faith in popular rule.
The United States has very high literacy rates and a well-devel-
oped civil society, not to mention a generally successful economy and
an  ideological devotion to tolerance and democratic governance.  If
we reject the possibility that even the United States can actually practice
self-government—including a once-every-220-year reflection on the
adequacy of our framework of governance—then we should have the
good grace to admit that we have lost faith in what most people have
found most admirable about the United States.  Michael Lind has
noted that “[p]residents as diverse as William McKinley, Gerald Ford,
and Jimmy Carter have spoken the simple words: ‘Here the people
rule.’”43  It is a great slogan.  But do we really believe in it enough to
take our chances on talking with our fellow Americans about how best
to forge a common future together, including creating a Constitution
adequate for the twenty-first century?  Or do we really believe that the
very last time that slogan had operative importance was 1787, when, of
course, a laughably—or, more accurately, lamentably—constricted
portion of the population was represented?
43. Michael Lind, Do the People Rule?, 26 WILSON Q. 40 (2002), available at http://www.
newamerica.net/publications/articles/2002/do_the_people_rule; see also RICHARD D.
PARKER, “HERE THE PEOPLE RULE”: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994).
